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ABSTRACT: This paper compares the levels of Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) emphasis between defense contractors and private 
firms that receive the majority of revenues from commercial sources. 
Corporate websites from three major industry groups (large defense 
contractors, Fortune 500 companies, and highly ranked CRS firms) were 
examined and rated based on information regarding their emphases on 
health and safety, environment, diversity, human rights, philanthropy, and 
corporate governance. The results indicate that defense contractors place 
less emphasis on those CSR categories than do private firms.  The findings 
are explained by stakeholder differences and may be attributed to the highly 
regulated environment of public procurement.   
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Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR; Bowen, 1953; Carroll, 
1999) receives increasing attention from a variety of sources, 
including non-governmental organizations (NGOs), trade unions, 
consumers, shareholders, and scholars (Jenkins, 2005; McCrudden 
2006), especially in light of troublesome cases such as Enron 
(accounting fraud), Nike (child labor), Shell (sinking of the Brent 
Spar), and British Petroleum (oil spill).  CSR is now viewed as a core 
competency for many companies, contributing to their competitive 
advantage and long-term profits, leading them to value CSR on the 
same level as financial performance (Porter & Kramer, 2006; Davis, 
1960; Hurst, 2004). 
CSR expectations of a different sort apply to firms that  engage in 
public procurement via government contracts. Because they act as 
agents of public officials to promote public values and to accomplish 
public purposes (McCrudden, 2007), these contractors have 
obligations beyond those of firms that operate purely in the private 
realm; government contractors must act responsibly on behalf of 
public authorities (Cohen & Eimicke, 2009). Yet, little research 
attention has been paid to the question of how the CSR of 
government contractors might differ from that of firms that derive 
their revenue from purely commercial and non-government sources 
(hereafter, private firms).  
Purpose and Scope      
This paper seeks to help fill this research gap by conducting an 
exploratory comparison of the CSR of firms that engage in public 
procurement with the CSR of private firms.  By “exploratory 
comparison,” we mean a survey that will identify and document the 
important features of the CSR landscape in order to provide a useful 
foundation for deeper and more focused analysis of those features.  
As a first step toward investigating the CSR of government 
contractors, we focus on that subset of contractors—defense 
contractors—to the U.S. federal (i.e., national) government whose CSR 
is arguably most different from that of private firms.  Weapons 
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manufacturers have been characterized from a moral perspective as 
socially irresponsible (Baker, 2005). Critics argue that their products 
(e.g., weapons) cause human death, injury, and environmental 
damage. Further, because defense contractors are for-profit 
industries, they have incentives to sell weapons to non-state actors 
(e.g., revolutionary militias in other countries), thereby producing 
negative externalities (Byrne, 2007).   
In addition to focusing on defense contractors, we focus on the 
discretionary facet of CSR.  Carroll (1999) has proposed a framework 
of CSR orientations and behaviors in four domains: economic, ethical, 
legal, and discretionary. Some, however, see Carroll’s discretionary 
domain as the only truly compelling domain of CSR because it entails 
those philanthropic attitudes and activities that a firm is free to 
choose to pursue.  The discretionary domain reaches beyond the 
legal and ethical domains of CSR, which arguably represent common 
obligations and expectations requiring no special corporate attention 
(Davis, 1960; 1973), as well as the economic domain which some 
argue should be the sole focus of corporate attention (Friedman, 
1970; Steiner, 1971). Thus, the only domain of orientations and 
actions upon which scholars agree is the discretionary domain; hence 
our focus on that domain. 
Method and Organization 
As an exploratory study, this paper relies upon publicly available 
data from corporate websites and upon existing instruments and 
frameworks to measure and compare CSR. It examines three groups:  
 The largest defense contractors that derive at least 70% of 
revenues from federal government contracts. 
 The highest ranked CSR companies (as ranked by Boston 
College Center for Corporate Citizenship). 
 The largest Fortune 500 companies.  
To assess and compare these firms’ CSR, we used an instrument 
developed by the Institute for Supply Management (ISM), together 
with Hurst’s (2004) framework for comparing CSR between European 
and U.S. firms.  Additional assessment factors were derived from the 
best practices of the top CSR companies.  Assessments and 
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comparisons were obtained in six CSR categories associated with the 
discretionary domain: health and safety, environment, diversity, 
human rights, philanthropy, and corporate governance.   
The paper is organized as follows. After a brief review of CSR-
related literature and policy pertaining to defense contractors, the 
methodology is presented in more detail.  The data and analysis are 
then given, followed by discussion of the results and conclusions.       
BACKGROUND 
 
CSR refers to the obligations of companies to make decisions 
beneficial to society (Bowen, 1953) or, alternatively, the society’s 
expectations of firms regarding their behaviors in the economic, legal, 
ethical, and discretionary domains of action (Carroll, 1999). 
Researchers typically treat CSR behaviors as factors that affect 
corporate profitability (see, for example, Aupperle, Carroll, & Hatfield, 
1985; Berman, Wicks, Kotha, & Jones, 1999) rather than as 
dependent variables.  Others (Campbell, 2007; Hiss, 2009) call for 
attention to factors, especially institutional factors (e.g., laws, rules, 
norms), that may shape a firm’s CSR. 
CSR Literature Related to Public Procurement 
The effect of laws and regulations on firms is routinely noted in 
the business ethics literature (Goodpaster, 1991: 58; Phillips, 
Freeman, & Wicks, 2003: 490-491). Clearly, however, firms operate 
in different legal-regulatory regimes. Some firms’ relationships with 
government are passive and limited, consisting mainly of compliance 
with rules that apply equally to all firms, for example, labor and 
environmental laws.  Other firms have extensive and close 
relationships with government through, for example, supplying 
products and services for public authorities. In such active 
relationships, a firm has additional rules and regulations with which 
to comply. These higher levels of exposure to governmental 
influences create opportunities for a firm’s CSR to be shaped 
differently than that of firms with lesser or no relations with 
government.  
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Several writers (Aaronson, 2005; Fox, Ward, & Howard, 2002; 
Moon, 2004) have analyzed the role and influence of government in 
CSR.  Fox et al. (2002) described government’s four possible roles: 
(1) mandating (establishing minimum standards for CSR actions 
within a legal framework); (2) facilitating (enabling or incentivizing 
firms); (3) partnering (with firms in CSR-related actions); or (4) 
endorsing (providing acknowledgement or appreciation). De la Cuesta 
Gonzàlez and Martinez (2004) have noted that public procurement 
has been used as a tool for promoting CSR in several EU states, and 
Aaronson (2005) has advocated that the U.S. government use public 
procurement for similar purposes.  McCrudden (2006) argued that 
the influence of public procurement law depends on several factors, 
including the subject matter of CSR, the level of government 
authority, and even the place of performance of the public contract.   
Much CSR-related scholarship in public procurement relates to 
sustainability (see, for example, Brammer & Walker, 2007; Walker, 
Disistro, & McBain, 2008; Walker & Brammer, 2009; Walker & 
Phillips, 2009). Oldroyd, Grosvold, and Millington (2011) noted that 
implementation of sustainable procurement practices in the public 
sector depends on factors such as potential cost savings, while the 
enhancement of reputation is the main consideration for private 
firms. 
To summarize, scholars have established the relevance of 
governments in promoting CSR, and they have noted the role of 
public procurement as a tool to that end.  We found no research, 
however, on specific ways in which government actions, including 
public procurement-related actions, might shape or affect a firm’s 
CSR. 
Stakeholder Theory 
In addition to stockholders, a firm’s stakeholders includes: 
employees, customers, suppliers, and the community.    According to 
stakeholder theories of CSR (see, for example, Freeman, 2004), a 
firm’s relationship with its stakeholders is defined by trade-offs 
between the rights of the firm to operate in a particular realm 
(provided by stakeholders) with the economic and social contributions 
it provides in return. Stakeholders thus have rights to expect certain 
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CSR-related actions or behaviors from a firm.  Obviously, public 
authorities are major stakeholders with a unique set of expectations 
and demands for those firms that engage in public procurement.  
Firms have several ways to inform stakeholders of their CSR, and 
scholars have paid much attention to how firms use marketing for 
this means (see, for example, Bronn & Vrioni, 2001; Maignan & 
Ferrell, 2004).  Apropos this paper, firms use corporate websites to 
publicize and promote their CSR, and the question is whether the 
information on these websites suggests a difference between the 
CSR of firms that engage in public procurement and those that do 
not.    
U.S. Department of Defense Procurement Policy 
CSR is embedded in U.S. procurement law as an extension of 
public policy. Table 1 gives examples of how CSR objectives are 




(FAR Part 19) 
Small Businesses; Historically Underutilized Businesses; Service-
Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Businesses; Women-Owned Small 
Businesses  
Labor Rights and 
Protections 
(FAR Part 22) 
Safety Standards; Equal Employment Opportunity; Age 




(FAR Part 23) 
Sustainable Acquisition; Energy and Water Efficiency; Hazardous 
Materials; Recovered Materials and Biobased Products; Drug-Free 
Workplace; Radioactive Materials; Ozone-Depleting Substances  
 
Table 1.  DoD Procurement Regulations 
 
Contractors for the Department of Defense (DOD) are required by 
contract clauses and through various representations and 
certifications to address all such concerns. These serve to hold 
contractors responsible for their actions as agents of the government.  
CSR Research on Defense Firms 
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Hurst (2004) compared the corporate ethics, governance and 
social responsibility of European companies with those in the U.S. 
Using information that was publicly available on websites, reports, 
and business databases, he analyzed European and American 
companies in the technology, energy, healthcare, and defense 
industries using the following questions:  
 Has the company publicized a Code of Conduct/Ethics?  
 Are the company’s conflict of interest guidelines publicly 
available to investors?  
 Does the company make it clear who the designated 
Ethics/Compliance Officer is?  
 Does the company have a whistle-blowing process 
implemented and is it easily accessible?  
 Does the company publish a CSR or sustainability report?  
 Is CSR one of the company’s core corporate principles or 
business objectives?  
European companies scored higher on the CSR indicators as nearly 
50% of them had CSR embedded in their corporate strategies, 
compared to only 20% of U.S. companies.   
This study also indicated that the defense industry paid less 
attention to CSR than the other industries.  Hurst found that neither 
Lockheed Martin nor Northrop Grumman published a CSR or 
sustainability report, and that CSR was not a corporate principle or 
objective.  Lockheed Martin “[met] all of the ethics requirements but 
failed to even mention CSR” (Hurst, 2004).  However, they set the 
standard by publishing the most comprehensive ethics code.  
Similarly, Northrop Grumman also failed to mention CSR publicly, 
though its whistle-blowing process was the best in the study.  
Halpern (2008) investigated the CSR of defense firms that 
manufacture command, control, communications, computer, 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance equipment.  Regarding 
Carroll’s (1999) four domains of CSR, Halpern found that these 
defense firms have a greater emphasis on the economic and legal 
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elements of CSR than firms in general. He noted that discretionary 
activities of these defense firms were suppressed by FAR provisions 
that restrict their ability to make charitable donations that are not 
taken from their profits.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
This study uses publicly available information to compare the 
emphasis placed on CSR by the following companies: 
 Defense Contractors: Top 5 defense contractors with over 
70% of revenues from the U.S. government. 
 CSR Companies: Top 5 CSR companies as ranked by Boston 
College Center for Corporate Citizenship. 
 Largest Firms: Top 5 Fortune 500 companies representing 
different industries.  
Each of the fifteen firms is assessed from public information in six 
CSR categories (health and safety, environment, diversity, human 
rights, discretionary/philanthropy, and corporate governance).  The 
assessment combines ISM’s CSR instrument (ISM, 2011) with Hurst’s 
(2004) framework for comparing CSR between European and U.S. 
firms.  Additional assessment factors were derived by the authors 
(shown as “authors” below) from the best practices of the top CSR 
companies.   
Framework 
Table 2 shows the four factors in each of six CSR categories to be 
examined for each company, as well as the source (i.e., ISM, Hurst, or 
Authors) for each of the factors.   
Category Factors Source 
Health and Safety 
Publishes safety program/policies.  ISM 
Trains employees and suppliers   ISM  
Publishes safety goals.  Authors 
Has processes to measure/document safety 
performance.   
ISM 
Environment 
Has environmental goals in place.  Authors 
Recycles and minimizes waste and environmental 
impact.  
ISM 
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Reports environmental efforts.  ISM 
Pursues discretionary initiatives.  ISM 
   Diversity 
Has programs/processes to promote.  ISM 
Trains employees and suppliers.  ISM 
Promotes equal access to employment opportunities.  ISM 
Pursues discretionary diversity initiatives. Authors 
Human Rights 
Has program and/or processes to promote.  ISM 
Trains employees on human rights.  ISM 
Promotes enforcement to suppliers.  ISM 
Has initiatives to promote human rights.  Authors 
Discretionary 
Activities demonstrate commitment to the community.  ISM 
Encourages employees to volunteer ISM 
Efforts include charitable donations ISM 
Partners with others for community projects.   Authors 
Corporate 
Publishes a Code of Conduct or Standards of Business.  ISM/Hurst 
Core principles/values reflect CSR.  Hurst 
Publishes CSR/Sustainability Report. Hurst 
Reports CSR efforts to higher authority or governance  Authors 
 
Table 2. CSR Factors 
       
Selection of Firms 
The selected defense contractors (Table 3) had the highest 
percentage of public revenue, with annual revenues exceeding $10 
billion.  All five of the companies earned over 70% of revenue from 
the government. (In Tables 3, 4, and 5 below, revenues are as 
reported from 2010 annual reports, and percentages of revenue from 
the U.S. government were found at www.usaspending.gov).  
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Table 3. Defense Contractors 
 
The second group (Table 4) includes five Fortune 500 companies, 
which earn the majority of revenues from commercial sources. These 
companies represent a diverse industry-base and earn less than 20% 
of their revenues from the U.S. government.   
 
 
Table 4. Largest Companies  
 
The final group (Table 5) represents the companies ranked as the 
top five CSR companies according to Boston College’s Center for 
Corporate Citizenship.  These companies set the standard for CSR in 
large companies whose revenue exceeds $10 billion.   
Defense Contractors Industry Revenue Government % 
Lockheed Martin  Aerospace and Defense $45.8B 76% 
Northrop Grumman Aerospace and Defense $34.7B 92% 
General Dynamics Aerospace and Defense $32.4B 72% 
Raytheon Company Aerospace and Defense $25.1B 88% 
L-3 Communications  Aerospace and Defense $15.7B 83% 
Fortune 500 Companies Industry Revenues Government % 
Walmart General Merchandizer $421B 0.00024% 
Exxon Petroleum Refining $354B 2.06% 
GM Motor Vehicles $135B 2.07% 
Bank of America Commercial Banking $134B 0.13% 
Hewlett Packard Computers $126B 18.89% 
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Table 5. Top 5 CSR Companies 
Rating Scheme 
Each company was assessed in order to judge the extent to which 
it addressed the six CSR categories.  Each of the factors in the six 
categories elicits a yes or no response, which is given the 
corresponding value of “1” and “0,” respectively, based on a review of 
information on the firm’s website.  The sum of the factor values in 
each category will thus range from 0 to 4, with the corresponding 
adjectival ratings for CSR emphasis in each category: 0=No, 1=Low, 
2=Moderate, 3=High, 4=Very High. 
 
PRESENTATION OF RESULTS 
Tables 6, 7, and 8 show the assessments for each group of firms.   
 









4 3 4 4 1 
Environment 4 4 4 4 1 
Diversity 4 4 3 4 2 
Human Rights 3 3 0 2 0 
Discretionary 4 4 4 4 2 
Corporate 2 4 3 3 1 
 
Table 6. Ratings for Defense Companies 
Top 5 CSR Companies Industry Revenue Government % 
Johnson & Johnson Pharmaceuticals $61.6B 1.64% 
Walt Disney Entertainment $38.1B 0% 
Kraft Foods Food Consumer Products $49.2B 6.12% 
Microsoft Computer Software $69.9B 1.01% 
PepsiCo Food Consumer Products $57.8B 3.22% 
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CSR Category WalMart Exxon Bank of 
America 




4 4 4 3 4 
Environment 4 4 4 4 4 
Diversity 4 4 4 4 4 
Human Rights 3 4 2 0 4 
Discretionary 4 4 4 4 4 
Corporate 3 4 4 2 4 
 
Table 7. Ratings for Largest Companies 
 
CSR Category Johnson & 
Johnson 





4 4 4 3 4 
Environment 4 4 4 4 4 
Diversity 4 4 4 4 4 
Human Rights 4 4 4 4 4 
Discretionary 4 4 4 4 4 
Corporate 4 4 4 4 4 
 
Table 8. Ratings for Top CSR Companies 
The data indicate that the emphasis on CSR by defense 
contractors is different than that of other companies, to the extent 
that emphasis is evident on corporate websites.  Figure 1 shows that 
defense contractors show less emphasis on CSR than the companies 
that receive the majority of their revenues from commercial sources.   


















Figure 1. Total Ratings by Group of Companies for All CSR 
Categories. 
 
Of the 120 factors assessed (5 companies*6 CSR categories*4 
factors), defense contractors had a ratings total of 89 (74.17%), CSR 
companies had a ratings total of 119 (99.17%), and the largest 
companies had a ratings total of 109 (90.83%).   
Figure 2 shows that L-3 Communications scored significantly 
lower than other defense contractors, heavily influencing the group 
totals.     
 























Figure 2. Total Number of Questions Addressed By Each Defense 
Contractor 
  
Figure 3 gives a comparison of the ratings of each group of 
companies in the six CSR categories.    
















Figure 3. Ratings by Group for Each CSR Category 
Figure 4 consolidates the data for all of the companies to 
illustrate these least emphasized categories. All three groups of 
companies were rated as having a “High” and “Very High” emphasis 
on the discretionary, diversity, environmental, and health and safety 
categories.   












Figure 4. Ratings for all Companies in Each CSR Category 
 
DISCUSSION 
 Differences between defense contractors and other firms in levels 
of CSR emphasis may be explained in several ways, most of which are 
related to the unique features of the very different “markets” in which 
they operate.   
 Stakeholder theory calls attention to the particular demands that 
influential stakeholders place on a firm regarding CSR. For private 
firms, the most influential stakeholders are those that contribute 
most to profitability, such as individual consumers, corporate 
customers, and supply chain partners. To the extent that a strong 
CSR emphasis makes a firm more attractive to these stakeholders, 
CSR enhances profitability. Thus, private firms have strong incentives 
to promote their CSR strengths as a way of advertising, especially 
through means such as corporate websites that can reach many 
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potential stakeholders. 
 These incentives are not so strong for defense firms that operate 
under a monopsony (i.e., one buyer, many sellers).   The main 
stakeholders to which defense contractors must promote themselves 
are federal agencies that buy their products.  Clearly, corporate 
websites are not important as means for promoting CSR in such 
cases.  Indeed, whether or not a particular firm is selected for a 
defense contract will depend almost exclusively on information that 
the firm provides only in its proposal.  Thus, a more appropriate way 
to judge a defense firm’s CSR would be to include an evaluation of 
the CSR-related representations and certifications which it is required 
to make in its proposals.  
 The focus on the government as their main source of revenue 
forces defense contractors to have different views of CSR than those 
held by private firms. Defense firms operate under and comply with 
the provisions of the FAR, which creates a complex set of intricate 
and arcane rules that are of no concern to private firms. Defense 
firms have a compliance orientation towards CSR, because the risks 
of noncompliance (e.g., being disqualified from a contracting action; 
unfavorable media attention) are so severe.  Essentially, a firm 
wishing to sell to the government derives profit by winning contracts, 
which means playing by the rules. Public procurement results in a 
defense firm’s profit motives becoming inextricably linked to its 
adherence to norms and governmental expectations. Risk-averse 
attitudes and approaches thus prevail among defense firms, while 
private firms have incentives to “push the envelope” on discretionary 
CSR-related actions and initiatives.   
 The FAR also reinforces an orientation towards ethics as an 
essential CSR domain for defense contractors.  The FAR intends 
explicitly to promote ethical practices in federal contracting; it 
contains ninety-five references to either “ethics” or “ethical.”  Many of 
its requirements (e.g., process transparency) contribute to an 
environment that helps curb wrongdoing and promotes ethical 
behaviors.  Defense firms that are focused on complying with the FAR 
will naturally perceive such compliance as inherently constituting 
ethical behavior in the CSR realm. 
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 Many aspects of federal contracting under the FAR contain 
features that purely commercial firms may consider discretionary.  
Policy provisions concerning small and disadvantaged businesses are 
a good example.  While a commercial firm might decide, as a 
discretionary “goodwill” action, to sponsor minority scholarships, the 
FAR promotes such actions as matters of public policy.  As noted 
above, socioeconomic policies are promoted through, for example, 
the Historically Underutilized Business Zone (HUBZone) program, 
small businesses owned and controlled by service-disabled veterans, 
and women-owned small business.  Thus, the FAR includes 
something of an implicit CSR framework.  Operating within that 
framework, defense firms naturally see compliance with the FAR as 
accomplishing at least some of their discretionary CSR. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This study suggests that differences exist in discretionary CSR 
orientations of defense contractors and private firms, and further, 
that these differences may be due to the extent to which these firms 
engage in public procurement.  In particular, the myriad rules of the 
public procurement marketplace appear to divert a defense firm’s 
attention away from discretionary CSR orientations (e.g., human 
rights, philanthropy) and toward legal compliance and ethical 
behavior. Further, unlike private firms, defense contractors have little 
profit incentive to advertise their CSR broadly, because one main 
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